Finding consistent global checkpoints of a distributed computation is important for analyzing, testing, or verifying properties of these computations. In this paper we present a theoretical foundation for nding consistent global checkpoints. Given an arbitrary set S of local checkpoints, we prove exactly which sets of other local checkpoints can be combined with S to build consistent global checkpoints, and we present an algorithm for nding all such global checkpoints. The minimal and maximal consistent global checkpoints are presented as special cases. The results are based on the notion of zigzag paths introduced by Netzer and Xu 14]. We also present a method for nding zigzag paths using the rollback-dependency graph introduced by Wang 17, 16] .
Introduction
Consistency of global states is a recurring theme in distributed systems 10] . A global state is a set of individual process states, one per process, that represents a \snapshot" at some instant of each process' execution. When global states are periodically recorded or analyzed during execution they are called global checkpoints. Global checkpoints have applications in many problems, such as transparent failure recovery 9], distributed debugging 6, 7] , monitoring distributed events 15], setting distributed breakpoints 13], protocol speci cation and veri cation 8], and others 17, 16] . In this paper we explore a type of global checkpoint that is said to be consistent, meaning that it is a snapshot of process states that actually occurred simultaneously during the execution or had the potential of occurring simultaneously 5]. Checkpoints are consistent when no causal dependency exists between any of its local process states 5] (for brevity we use the term consistent checkpoint when the context makes it clear that a global checkpoint is implied). Finding consistent checkpoints is a natural part of many problems involving global states. For example, in failure recovery, the system state can be restored from a saved consistent checkpoint and then restarted 9, 17, 16] . The problem we address is to determine how individual local checkpoints can be combined with those from other processes to form global checkpoints that are consistent. A solution to this problem forms the basis for many algorithms and protocols that must record on-the-y only consistent checkpoints or determine post-mortem which global checkpoints are consistent.
To introduce the problem, let us consider how to build a consistent checkpoint from some arbitrary set S of local checkpoints from some (but not all) processes. First, since a global checkpoint contains one local checkpoint from each process, we must select one candidate checkpoint from each process not represented in S, and combine these candidates with S to form the global checkpoint. However, these candidates must be selected carefully to ensure the resulting global checkpoint is consistent. Figure 1 illustrates the basic problem with an example three-process execution (the X's indicate local checkpoints). Given two local checkpoints such as A and C, if they are to belong to the same consistent checkpoint, consistency requires that neither causally a ect the other (in the sense that no sequence of messages is sent after A and received before C); this condition is necessary for the checkpoints to be consistent. In Figure 1 , a path of messages exists from A to C, so any global checkpoint constructed from them will never be consistent, since such a checkpoint would always have a causal path between two of its local checkpoints (A and C). In contrast, checkpoints B and C have no causal path between them (they are mutually unordered) and indeed they can be combined with the second checkpoint of P 2 to form a consistent checkpoint, as shown by the dashed line.
Checkpoints lying on the dashed line form a consistent checkpoint because no message path exists from any checkpoint on the line to any other on the line. From this observation, one might be tempted to conclude that any set of mutually unordered local checkpoints can always be used to build a consistent checkpoint. However, this is not true | being unordered is not always su cient to ensure consistency. In Figure 1 , checkpoints B and D are also unordered, but they cannot be combined in a consistent way. There is no checkpoint in P 2 that can be combined with both B and D while maintaining consistency. Because of message m4, D is not consistent with the second checkpoint of P 2 (or any earlier checkpoint in P 2 ) since those checkpoints have a causal path to D. Similarly, because of message m3, B is not consistent with any later checkpoints in P 2 since B has a causal path to those checkpoints. Thus, no checkpoint in P 2 can be used to build a consistent checkpoint containing both B and D.
In this paper we explore these issues in detail, proving precisely which local checkpoints can be used in conjunction with a given set of checkpoints S to build consistent checkpoints. This problem was rst considered by Netzer and Xu 14] who proved the conditions necessary and su cient for some consistent checkpoint to be built from S, but they did not de ne the set of possible consistent checkpoints or present an algorithm to construct them. Building on Netzer and Xu's results, Wang 17, 16] then presented algorithms for computing from S the minimum and maximum consistent checkpoints that can be constructed and showed their application to several problems. We further build on this past work by analyzing the set of all consistent checkpoints that can be built from S. We prove exactly which sets of local checkpoints from each process can be combined with those in S and still retain consistency. We also present an algorithm that enumerates all such consistent checkpoints. These results provide a deeper understanding of what constitutes consistency and can be applied to applications that use consistent checkpoints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the system model, and discuss related work in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 we present our theoretical foundation for reasoning about consistency and give an algorithm for nding all the consistent checkpoints that contain S. We also characterize the location of the maximal and minimal consistent checkpoints, and discuss a graph (the rollback-dependency graph), introduced by Wang 17, 16] , that can be used in the construction of consistent checkpoints. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model
The distributed computation we consider consists of N spatially separated sequential processes denoted by P 1 , P 2 , , P N . The processes do not share a common memory or a common clock. Message passing is the only way for processes to communicate with one another. The computation is asynchronous: each process progresses at its own speed and messages are exchanged through reliable communication channels, whose transmission delays are nite but arbitrary. Communication channels are FIFO.
Execution of a process is modeled by three types of events: the send event of a message, the receive event of a message, and a checkpoint event. The states of processes depend on one another due to interprocess communication. Lamport A local checkpoint of a process is a recorded state of the process. A set of local checkpoints, one from each process, is called a consistent global checkpoint (or just consistent checkpoint) i none of them happened before the other. We assume that processes take checkpoints asynchronously. Each checkpoint taken by a process is assigned a unique sequence number. The i th (i 0) checkpoint of process P p is assigned the sequence number i and is denoted by C p;i . We assume that each process takes an initial checkpoint before execution begins and a virtual checkpoint after execution ends. Checkpoints are sometimes denoted by the letters A; B; or C for clarity. The i th checkpoint interval of process P p is all the computation performed between its (i ? 1) th and i th checkpoints (and includes the (i ? 1) th checkpoint but not i th ).
Background and Related Work
The de nition of consistency states that for a set S of local checkpoints to be a consistent global checkpoint, S must contain one local checkpoint from each process, and for any two checkpoints A; B 2 S, A and B must be unordered. As discussed above, from this observation one might conclude that, if we consider a smaller set S containing local checkpoints from some processes but not others, having all local checkpoints in S be mutually unordered is also su cient to ensure that a consistent checkpoint containing S can be built. However, as shown in Figure 1 , the subtle nature of consistency makes this conclusion false. Netzer and Xu 14] originally addressed this subtlety and proved the necessary and su cient conditions that S must meet to be able to construct a consistent checkpoint containing S. Our results are based on this past work, discussed next.
The basic subtlety is that, although no causal path may exist between any two checkpoints in S, this alone is insu cient to ensure that local checkpoints from processes not represented in S can be added to S to form a global state G that is consistent. The absence of causal paths does not fully capture whether S has the ability to become a consistent checkpoint. To determine exactly when S has this ability, Netzer and Xu 14] de ne a generalization of causal paths called zigzag paths, which we call Z-paths for brevity. They prove that it is the absence of Z-paths between checkpoints in S which guarantees that S can be extended to a consistent checkpoint. Since Z-paths capture the exact conditions for consistency, they are a powerful notion for reasoning about problems that involve consistent checkpoints 1, 2, 3, 4].
De nition 1 A Z-path exists from C p;i to C q;j i 1. p = q and i < j (i.e., one checkpoint precedes the other in the same process), or 1 2. there exist messages m 1 ; m 2 ; ; m n (n 1) such that (a) m 1 is sent by process P p after C p;i , (b) if m k (1 k < n) is received by P r , then m k+1 is sent by P r in the same or later checkpoint interval (although m k+1 may be sent before or after m k is received), and (c) m n is received by P q before C q;j .
A checkpoint C is said to be in a Z-cycle i there exists a Z-path from C to itself.
A Z-path between two checkpoints A and B is like a causal path | both are sequences of messages that start after A and end before B, and both de ne a transitive relation | but the di erences between them are important.
A causal path exists from A to B i there is a chain of messages starting after A and ending before B with each message sent after the previous one in the chain is received. Such a chain is also a Z-path, but a Z-path is also allowed to have any message in the chain be sent before the previous one is received, as long as the send and receive are in the same checkpoint interval. Thus, a causal path is always a Z-path, but a Z-path may not be a causal path. Figure 2a illustrates this di erence. There is a Z-path from A to B because message m1 is sent after A, m2 is sent in the same checkpoint interval as m1 is received, and m2 is received before B (the path forms a zigzag shape, hence the name). This Z-path is not a causal path.
Another di erence stems from Z-paths not always de ning a partial order. A Z-path can exist from a checkpoint back to itself (a Z-cycle). In contrast, causal paths never form cycles. In Figure 2a , a Z-cycle exists involving checkpoint C. Message m3 is sent after C, m4 is sent in the same interval in which m3 is received, and m4 is received before C, completing the Z-path from C to itself (the Z-cycle). To see the signi cance of Z-paths between checkpoints, consider the dashed lines in Figure 2b , which show the global states that can include A and B, or C. The Z-path from A to B forces any global state (or cut) passing through A and B to be inconsistent since the cut must cross either m1 or m2. Cutting through m1 means that A is ordered before the checkpoint taken after m1 is received; cutting through m2 means that the checkpoint taken before m1 is received is ordered before B. In either case, the existence of the Z-path renders it impossible to construct a global checkpoint, through both A and B, that contains only mutually unordered checkpoints. Similarly, any cut passing through C is inconsistent since it must cut across either m3 or m4, and as above the message being cut always renders the global checkpoint inconsistent.
To formally reason about Z-paths, we use the following notation, motivated by Wang 17, 16] .
De nition 2 Let A,B be individual checkpoints and R,S be sets of checkpoints. Let ; be a relation de ned over checkpoints and sets of checkpoints such that 1. A ; B i a Z-path exists from A to B, 2. A ; S i a Z-path exists from A to some member of S, 3. S ; A i a Z-path exists from some member of S to A, and 4. R ; S i a Z-path exists from some member of R to some member of S.
Using this notation, the results of Netzer and Xu are easily described. Their basic result is that no Z-path exists between two checkpoints exactly when they can be used to build a consistent checkpoint. Proofs of this result (and several corollaries) appear in Netzer and Xu 14] . Note that S 6 ; S implies the checkpoints in S are all from di erent processes. 
Finding Consistent Global Checkpoints
Although Netzer and Xu proved the exact conditions under which a set of checkpoints S can be used to build a consistent checkpoint, they did not discuss in detail how to actually construct the consistent checkpoints. Our main results concern this issue. Wang 17, 16] presents algorithms for nding certain consistent checkpoints that contain S, but he focuses only on the so-called minimal and maximal checkpoints (discussed below). He uses a graph called the rollback-dependency graph (or R-graph) and presents several applications of minimal and maximal checkpoints. We extend these results next by discussing exactly which consistent checkpoints can be built from S, showing the minimal and maximal checkpoints as special cases. We also present an algorithm to enumerate these consistent checkpoints. In Section 5 we discuss the R-graph, proving that it represents exactly the Z-paths of an execution. The R-graph is thus useful in implementing consistent checkpoint construction since it shows between which checkpoints Z-paths exist.
Extending S to a Consistent Checkpoint
Given a set S of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S, we rst analyze what other checkpoints can be combined with S to build a consistent global checkpoint. There are three important observations. First, none of the checkpoints that have a Z-path to or from any of the checkpoints in S can be used because, by Theorem 1, no checkpoints between which a Z-path exists can ever be part of a consistent checkpoint. Thus, only those checkpoints that have no Z-paths to or from any of the checkpoints in S are candidates. We call the set of all such candidates the Z-cone of S. Similarly, we call the set of all checkpoints that have no causal path to or from any checkpoint in S the C-cone of S. 2 The Z-cone and C-cone help us reason about orderings and consistency. Since causal paths are always Z-paths, the Z-cone of S is a subset of the C-cone of S, as shown in Figure 3 for some arbitrary S. Note that if a Z-path exists from checkpoint C q;j in process P q to a checkpoint in S, then a Z-path also exists from every checkpoint in P q preceding C q;j to the same checkpoint in S (because Z-paths are transitive); similarly, causal paths are transitive as well. The second observation is that, although candidates for building a consistent checkpoint from S must lie in the Z-cone of S, not all checkpoints in the Z-cone are usable. If a checkpoint in the Z-cone is involved in a Z-cycle, then it cannot be part of a consistent checkpoint by Corollary 2. We prove below in Lemma 1 that if we remove from consideration all checkpoints in the Z-cone that are in Z-cycles, then the remaining checkpoints are exactly those useful for building a consistent checkpoint from S. That is, each such checkpoint can be combined with S to build some consistent checkpoint.
De nition 3 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S. Then, for each process P q , the set S q useful is de ned as S q useful = fC q;i j (S 6 ; C q;i )^(C q;i 6 ; S)^(C q;i 6 ; C q;i )g:
In addition we de ne S useful = q S q useful :
Lemma 1 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S. Let C q;i be any checkpoint of process P q such that C q;i 6 2 S. Then, S fC q;i g can be extended to a consistent checkpoint if and only if C q;i 2 S useful .
Proof: Suppose S fC q;i g can be extended to a consistent checkpoint. Then, by Theorem 1, (S fC q;i g) 6 ; (S fC q;i g). This implies (S 6 ; C q;i , C q;i 6 ; S, and C q;i 6 ; C q;i ) which implies C q;i 2 S q useful S useful .
Conversely, suppose C q;i 2 S useful . Then, C q;i 2 S q useful , since C q;i is a checkpoint of process P q . Hence, S 6 ; C q;i , C q;i 6 ; S, and C q;i 6 ; C q;i . Moreover S 6 ; S, and hence S fC q;i g 6 ; S fC q;i g. So, by Theorem 1, S fC q;i g can be extended to a consistent checkpoint. 2
Lemma 1 states that, if we are given a set S such that S 6 ; S, we are guaranteed that any single checkpoint from S useful can belong to some consistent global checkpoint that also contains S. However, our nal observation is that, if we attempt to build a consistent checkpoint from S by choosing a subset T of checkpoints from S useful to combine with S, we have no guarantee that the checkpoints in T have no Z-paths among them. In other words, simply because all the checkpoints in S useful are in the Z-cone of S (and thus have no Z-paths to or from any checkpoint in S), Z-paths may still exist between members of S useful . Therefore, we have one nal constraint we must place on the set T we choose from S useful to build a consistent checkpoint from S: the checkpoints in T must have no Z-paths among them. Furthermore, since S 6 ; S, by Theorem 1 at least one such T must exist. Theorem 2 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S and let T be any set of checkpoints such that S \ T = ;. Then, S T is a consistent global checkpoint if and only if 1. T S useful , 2. T 6 ; T, and 3. jS Tj = N. Proof: Suppose S T is a consistent global checkpoint. Let C 2 T. S fCg can be extended to a consistent global checkpoint since S T is one such extension. Hence, C 2 S useful by Lemma 1. Thus, every checkpoint in T belongs to S useful . Hence, T S useful . Since S T is a consistent global checkpoint, (S T) 6 ; (S T) by Theorem 1. In particular, T 6 ; T. By de nition, the number of checkpoints in any consistent global checkpoint is N so jS Tj = N.
Conversely, suppose S is a set of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S and T is any set of checkpoints disjoint from S satisfying the three conditions. Since T S useful , for any two checkpoints C and D such that C 2 T and D 2 S, C 6 ; D and D 6 ; C hold. Hence, T 6 ; S, and S 6 ; T. Moreover, since S 6 ; S, and T 6 ; T it follows that (S T) 6 ; (S T). Since jS Tj = N, S T is a consistent global checkpoint by Corollary 1. 2 
Minimal and Maximal Consistent Global Checkpoints
Theorem 2 shows us exactly which sets of checkpoints can be combined with S to form consistent checkpoints.
Two interesting special cases we discuss next are the minimal and maximal consistent checkpoints that contain S. Intuitively, these are the earliest and latest consistent checkpoints that can be constructed that contain S. The following formal de nitions are based on those by Wang 17, 16] .
De nition 4 Let S be any set of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S. Let M = S T be a consistent global checkpoint, where T = fC p1;i1 ; C p2;i2 ; C p k ;i k g and T \ S = ;. Then, 1. M is the maximal consistent checkpoint containing S i for any consistent checkpoint M 0 = S T 0 containing S, where T 0 = fC p1;j1 ; C p2;j2 ; C p k ;j k g, we have 8n : 1 n k. i n j n .
2. M is the minimal consistent checkpoint containing S i for any consistent checkpoint M 0 = S T 0 containing S, where T 0 = fC p1;j1 ; C p2;j2 ; C p k ;j k g, we have 8n : 1 n k. i n j n . Wang 17, 16] showed that the minimal (maximal) consistent checkpoints containing S are those formed by choosing from each process not represented in S the earliest (latest) checkpoint that has no Z-path to or from any member of S. Viewed in terms of the Z-cone of S, these checkpoints form what we might call the \leading" and \trailing" edges of the Z-cone, as illustrated in Figure 4 . This observation implies that the Z-cone possesses some interesting properties. First, the leading and trailing edges always exist. This follows from Theorem 2, which states that at least one set T must exist that can be used to extend S to a consistent checkpoint. In the degenerate case, the leading and trailing edges contain exactly the same checkpoints, and only one such T exists. In the general case, however, the leading and trailing edges are distinct. Second, the checkpoints making up the leading (and trailing) edge never have Z-paths between them (including any Z-cycles). Since the Z-cone is de ned to be those checkpoints with no Z-paths to or from S, it then follows that the checkpoints containing the leading and trailing edges (i.e., the minimal and maximal checkpoints) are always consistent. These properties are embodied in the following theorems. The existence of the minimal and maximal consistent checkpoints has been proven before (by Wang 17, 16] and others), but not directly in terms of the Z-cone, which we have shown to be the basis of consistency. Netzer and Xu 14] construct the minimal checkpoint in one of their proofs but never discuss its properties per se.
Theorem 3 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S and let S max = fC q;j j C q;j 2 S q useful^8 k > j:C q;k 6 2 S q useful g:
Then S max is the maximal consistent checkpoint containing S.
Proof: If C p;i 2 S, then C p;i is the only checkpoint that belongs to S p useful and hence C p;i 2 S max . Thus, every checkpoint in S belongs to S max and hence S S max . Since S q useful 6 = ; 8q, jS max j = N. Let S max = S T for some T such that S \ T = ;. Note that T is determined by S uniquely. If jSj = N, then T = ; and S itself is a consistent checkpoint by Corollary 1 and hence it follows that S max = S is the maximal consistent checkpoint containing S. So, we assume jSj < N. First, we prove that S T is a consistent checkpoint. To prove that S T is a consistent checkpoint, it is su cient to prove that all the conditions stated in Theorem 2 are satis ed. T S useful since T S max S useful .
Claim: T 6 ; T. Proof of Claim: Suppose T ; T. Since T S useful , C 6 ; C 8 C 2 T. Hence, there exist distinct checkpoints C p;i ; C q;j 2 T such that C p;i ; C q;j . Since C q;j 2 S useful , S fC q;j g can be extended to a consistent checkpoint by Lemma 1. Since C p;i ; C q;j , C p;k ; C q;j 8 k i. Also, since C p;i 2 T, (C p;k 6 2 S useful ) 8 k > i which implies ((C p;k ; C p;k ) _ (C p;k ; S) _ (S ; C p;k )) 8 k > i. Thus, (C p;k ; C p;k ) _ (C p;k ; (S fC q;j g)) _ ((S fC q;j g) ; C p;k ) 8k 0 and hence (S fC q;j g) p useful = ;, which means P p contains no checkpoint that can be used to extend S fC q;j g to a consistent checkpoint. This is a contradiction to Lemma 1. Hence, our assumption that T ; T is incorrect and hence T 6 ; T. Clearly, jS Tj = N. Thus, T satis es all the conditions of Theorem 2 and hence S T = S max is a consistent checkpoint.
Next, we prove that S max = S T is indeed the maximal consistent checkpoint containing S. Let T = fC p1;i1 ; C p2;i2 ; C p k ;i k g. Suppose T 0 = fC p1;j1 ; C p2;j2 ; C p k ;j k g is a set of checkpoints such that S T 0 is a consistent checkpoint. It is su cient to prove that j n i n 8n : 1 n k. Suppose not, then j n > i n for some n. Then, for this n, C pn;jn 6 2 S pn useful since C pn;in 2 S max and j n > i n . Hence, C pn;jn cannot belong to any consistent checkpoint containing S, by Lemma 1. This is a contradiction to the fact that S T 0 is a consistent checkpoint containing S. Hence, j n i n 8n : 1 n k and S max = S T is the maximal consistent checkpoint containing S. 2 Theorem 4 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 ; S and let S min = fC q;j j C q;j 2 S q useful^8 k < j:C q;k 6 2 S q useful g:
Then S min is the minimal consistent checkpoint containing S.
Proof: If C p;i 2 S, then C p;i is the only checkpoint that belongs to S p useful and hence C p;i 2 S min . Thus, every checkpoint in S belongs to S min and hence S S min . Since S q useful 6 = ; 8q, jS min j = N. Let S min = S T for some T such that S \ T = ;. Note that T is determined by S uniquely. If jSj = N, then T = ; and S itself is a consistent checkpoint by Corollary 1 and hence it follows that S min = S is the minimal consistent checkpoint containing S. So, we assume jSj < N. First, we prove that S T is a consistent checkpoint. To prove that S T is a consistent checkpoint, it is su cient to prove that all the conditions stated in Theorem 2 are satis ed. T S useful since T S min S useful .
Claim: T 6 ; T. Proof of Claim: Suppose T ; T. Since T S useful , C 6 ; C 8 C 2 T. Hence, there exist distinct checkpoints C p;i ; C q;j 2 T such that C p;i ; C q;j . C p;i 2 S p useful and C q;j 2 S q useful from the de nition of T. Since C p;i ; C q;j , C p;i ; C q;k 8 k j. This implies C p;i ; C 8 C 2 S q useful since C q;j is the rst checkpoint in S q useful . Since C p;i 2 T S useful , S fC p;i g can be extended to a consistent checkpoint by Lemma 1. Since S (S fC p;i g), (S fC p;i g) q useful S q useful . Moreover, since C p;i ; C 8 C 2 S q useful , it follows that C p;i ; (S fC p;i g) q useful which is a contradiction since there can be no Z-path from C p;i to any checkpoint in (S fC p;i g) q useful by the de nition of the set (S fC p;i g) q useful . Hence, T 6 ; T. Clearly, jS Tj = N. Hence, S T = S min is a consistent checkpoint.
Next, we prove that S min = S T is indeed the minimal consistent checkpoint containing S. Let T = fC p1;i1 ; C p2;i2 ; C p k ;i k g. Suppose T 0 = fC p1;j1 ; C p2;j2 ; C p k ;j k g is a set of checkpoints such that S T 0 is a consistent checkpoint. It is su cient to prove that j n i n 8n : 1 n k. Suppose not, then j n < i n for some n. Then, for this n, C pn;jn 6 2 S pn useful since C pn;in 2 S min and j n < i n . Hence, C pn;jn cannot belong to any consistent checkpoint containing S, by Lemma 1. This contradicts the fact that S T 0 is a consistent checkpoint. Hence, j n i n 8n : 1 n k and S min is the minimal consistent checkpoint containing S. 2
Algorithm for Enumerating Consistent Checkpoints
Above we showed exactly which checkpoints can be used to extend S to a consistent checkpoint. Our next main result is an algorithm to enumerate all such consistent checkpoints. Algorithms have been presented in the literature for computing various sets of consistent checkpoints, such as for global predicate detection 6] and recovery 17, 16], but none explicitly compute all the consistent checkpoints that include a given set S. Wang's work 17, 16] shows how to compute the maximal and the minimal consistent checkpoints that contain S. Our algorithm is not targeted toward a speci c application, as it simply computes the set of all consistent checkpoints containing S, but it illustrates the use of our theoretical results in determining consistent checkpoints. Our algorithm is novel in that it restricts its selection of checkpoints to those within the Z-cone of S and it checks for the presence of Z-cycles within the Z-cone. In the next section we show how to perform this detection using a graph, discussed originally by Wang 17, 16] , from which Z-cones and Z-paths can be detected.
Our algorithm is shown in Figure 5 . The function ComputeAllCgs(S) returns the set of all consistent checkpoints that contain S. The crux of our algorithm is the function ComputeAllCgsFrom(T; ProcSet) which extends a set of checkpoints T in all possible consistent ways, but uses checkpoints only from processes in the set ProcSet. After verifying that S 6 ; S, ComputeAllCgs simply calls ComputeAllCgsFrom, passing a ProcSet consisting of the processes not represented in S (lines 2{5). The resulting consistent checkpoints are collected in the global variable G which is returned (line 6). It is worth nothing that if S = ;, the algorithm computes all of the consistent checkpoints that exist in the execution.
The recursive function ComputeAllCgsFrom(T; ProcSet) works by choosing any process from ProcSet, say P q , and iterating through all checkpoints C in T q useful . Recall that Lemma 1 states that each such checkpoint extends T part-way toward a consistent checkpoint. This means that T C can itself be further extended, eventually arriving at a consistent checkpoint. Since this further extension is simply another instance of constructing all consistent checkpoints that contain checkpoints from a given set, we make a recursive call (line 14), passing T C and a ProcSet from which process P q is removed. The recursion eventually terminates when the passed set contains checkpoints from all processes (i.e., ProcSet is empty). ComputeAllCgsFrom(S; AllProcs) 6: return G 7: g 8: ComputeAllCgsFrom(T; ProcSet) f 9: if (P rocSet = ;) then 10: G = G fTg 11: else 12: let P q be any process in ProcSet 13: for each checkpoint C 2 T q useful do 14: ComputeAllCgsFrom(T fCg; ProcSet n fP q g) 15: g ComputeAllCgsFrom, then it also holds after the call to ComputeAllCgsFrom, and hence is an invariant.
It follows from this invariant and Corollary 1 that for all T 2 G, T is a consistent checkpoint containing S, since T is added to the set G only if Procset = ;. Conversely, suppose T is a consistent checkpoint containing S. Let T n S = fC p1;i1 ; C p2;i2 ; C pn;in g and T j = S fC p1;i1 ; C p2;i2 ; C pj;ij g (1 j n) and T 0 = ;. From Lemma 1, 8j : 1 j n; C pj;ij 2 (S T j?1 ) pj useful . Thus, T would have been included in the set G. Hence, G consists of precisely those consistent checkpoints that contain S. 2 13 
Finding Z-paths in a Distributed Computation
Tracking Z-paths on the y seems to be a di cult and remains an open problem. In this section, we describe a method for determining the existence of Z-paths between checkpoints in a distributed computation that has terminated or stopped execution, using the rollback-dependency graph (R-graph) introduced by Wang 17, 16] . First, we present the de nition of an R-graph.
De nition 5 The rollback-dependency graph of a distributed computation is a directed graph G = (V; E), where the vertices V are the checkpoints of the distributed computation and an edge (C p;i ; C q;j ) from the checkpoint C p;i to the checkpoint C q;j belongs to E if 1. p = q and j = i + 1, or 2. p 6 = q and a message m sent from the i th checkpoint interval of P p is received by P q in its j th checkpoint interval (i; j > 0).
Construction of the R-graph
When a process P p sends a message m in its i th checkpoint interval, it piggybacks the pair (p; i) with the message. When the receiver P q receives m in its j th checkpoint interval, it records the existence of an edge from C p;i to C q;j . When a process wants to construct the R-graph for nding Z-paths between checkpoints, it broadcasts a request message to collect the existing direct dependencies from all other processes and constructs the complete R-graph. We assume that each process stops execution after it sends reply to the request so that additional dependencies between checkpoints are not formed while the R-graph is being constructed. For each process, a volatile checkpoint is added; the volatile checkpoint represents the volatile state of the process 17, 16]. Example of an R-graph Figure 7 shows the R-graph of the computation in Figure 6 . In Figure 7 , C 1;3 ; C 2;3 ; and C 3;3 represent the volatile checkpoints, the checkpoints representing the last state the process attained before terminating.
Volatile checkpoints Figure 7 : The R-graph of the computation in Figure 6 We denote the fact that there is a path from C to D in the R-graph by C rd ; D (it only means that there is a path; it does not however specify any particular path). For example, in Figure 7 , C 1;0 rd ; C 3;2 . When we need to specify a particular path, we give the sequence of checkpoints that constitute the path. For example, (C 1;0 ; C 1;1 ; C 1;2 ; C 2;1 ; C 3;1 ; C 3;2 ) is a path from C 1;0 to C 3;2 and (C 1;0 ; C 1;1 ; C 1;2 ; C 2;1 ; C 2;2 ; C 2;3 ; C 3;2 ) is also a path from C 1;0 to C 3;2 .
The following theorem establishes the correspondence between the paths in the R-graph and the Z-paths between checkpoints. This correspondence is very useful in determining whether or not a Z-path exists between two given checkpoints.
Theorem 6 Let G = (V; E) be the R-graph of a distributed computation. Then, for any two checkpoints C p;i and C q;j , C p;i ; C q;j if and only if 1. p = q and i < j, or 2. C p;i+1 rd ; C q;j in G (note that in this case p could still be equal to q).
Proof: (() Su ciency: If p = q and i < j, then clearly C p;i ; C q;j . So, we assume that :((p = q)^(i < j)) holds and C p;i+1 rd ; C q;j in G. Let (C p;i+1 = C p0;i0 ; C p1;i1 ; ; C pm;im = C q;j ) be a path of minimum length from C p;i+1 to C q;j in the graph G. To prove C p;i ; C q;j , we use induction on m, the length of the minimal path from C p;i+1 to C q;j in G.
Let m = 1. In this case, we need to prove that if (C p;i+1 ; C q;j ) 2 E, then C p;i ; C q;j , which follows from the de nition of R-graph. Now, let m 2. Assume that for any two checkpoints C and D, if there exists a path of length k (k < m) from C to D in the graph G, then there exists a Z-path from C to D. By induction hypothesis, since (C p;i+1 = C p0;i0 ; C p1;i1 ; ; C pm?1;im?1 ) is a path of length m ? 1 from C p;i+1 to C pm?1;im?1 in G, C p;i ; C pm?1;im?1 .
Case (i): p m?1 = q. In this case, C pm?1;im?1 precedes C q;j in the same process P q and hence C pm?1;im?1 ; C q;j . Since ; is a transitive relation, it follows that C p;i ; C q;j .
Case (ii): p m?1 6 = q. In this case, a message M sent from the (i m?1 ) th checkpoint interval of P pm?1 was received by P q in its j th checkpoint interval. It is clear that the messages that caused the Z-path from C p;i to C pm?1;im?1 together with the message M constitute a Z-path from C p;i to C q;j and hence C p;i ; C q;j .
()) Necessity: Conversely, suppose C p;i ; C q;j . Assume that :((p = q)^(i < j)) holds. Then, there exists a sequence of messages M 1 ; M 2 ; ; M n (n 1) satisfying the conditions given in De nition 1. Now, we want to prove that C p;i+1 rd ; C q;j in G. To prove this, we use induction on n, the length of the sequence of messages that constitute the Z-path. If n = 1, then M 1 was sent after C p;i and received before C q;j . This implies that there exist integers i 0 and j 0 , i 0 > i and j 0 j such that M 1 was sent in the i 0th checkpoint interval of P p and was received by P q in its j 0 th checkpoint interval. Thus, (C p;i 0 ; C q;j 0 ) 2 E. Since i 0 > i, i + 1 i 0 . Thus, i + 1 i 0 , j 0 j, and (C p;i 0 ; C q;j 0 ) 2 E implies that C p;i+1 rd ; C q;j . Now, let n > 1. We assume that the result is true for all Z-paths consisting of fewer than n messages. Suppose the message sequence M 1 ; M 2 ; ; M n constitutes the Z-path from C p;i to C q;j . Assume that M 1 ; M 2 ; ; M n?1 constitutes a Z-path from C p;i to C r;k for some r and k. By induction hypothesis, C p;i+1 rd ; C r;k . Note that M n must have been sent by P r either in its k th checkpoint interval or some later checkpoint interval.
Case (i): Message M n is sent by P r in its k th checkpoint interval. In this case, (C r;k ; C q;j ) 2 E. Since C p;i+1 rd ; C r;k , it follows that C p;i+1 rd ; C q;j .
Case (ii): Message M n is sent by P r in its l th checkpoint interval for some l > k. In this case, C r;k rd ; C r;l and (C r;l ; C q;j ) 2 E. Since C p;i+1 rd ; C r;k , it follows that C p;i+1 rd ; C q;j . This proves the theorem. 2
The following Corollary gives the necessary and su cient conditions for a set of local checkpoints to be part of a consistent checkpoint in terms of paths in the R-graph.
Corollary 3 Let G = (V; E) be the R-graph of a distributed computation and let S be any set of checkpoints.
Then the following three statements are equivalent. 6 
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a theoretical foundation for determining consistent checkpoints in a distributed computation run. It is based on the notion of zigzag paths introduced by Netzer and Xu 14] . Zigzag paths help in identifying all the checkpoints that are useful for constructing consistent checkpoints. We also presented a characterization of the maximal and the minimal consistent checkpoints containing a given set of local checkpoints and also demonstrated how it can be used for rolling back the processes to the maximal consistent checkpoint in the event of a process failure. Based on the theoretical foundation, we also presented an algorithm for nding all the consistent checkpoints containing a given set S of local checkpoints; if we take S = ;, then the algorithm gives the set of all the consistent checkpoints of a distributed computation run. We established the correspondence between the Z-paths and the paths in the R-graph which helps nding the existence of Z-paths between checkpoints.
